AI
Anthropic
TLDR: LONDONâAnthropic released Claude Mythos Fable 5 to the public, but crypto users like Moonrock Capital founder Simon Dedic warn it could drive smart contract exploit hunting toward âbasically zero,â despite guardrails. The worry lands as crypto hacks hit $629.7 million in April, the most since February 2025.
Key Takeaways:
- Anthropic says Mythos uncovered 10,000 high or critical vulnerabilities in systemically important software, raising the question of public access.
- Fable 5 routes some cybersecurity topics to Claude Opus 4.8, while Dedic argues the model lowers the cost to find exploitable smart contract flaws to nearly nothing.
- Egorov doubts a DeFi hacking wave, predicting more operational security and supply chain failures instead, even as protocols face higher targeting pressure.
- A small group of cybersecurity and infrastructure providers will get access to Claude Mythos 5 with safeguards lifted in some areas.
Guardrails are supposed to calm the room, but crypto users heard a different sound. When hacking shortcuts get cheaper, they stop asking who can access the model and start asking who can withstand the next replay.
Guardrails are supposed to calm the room, but crypto users heard a different sound. When hacking shortcuts get cheaper, they stop asking who can access the model and start asking who can withstand the next replay.
Q&A
If guardrails reroute cybersecurity tasks, why do crypto users still fear near zero exploit discovery?
Rerouting can slow harmful workflows, but it does not stop attackers from learning from outputs, adapting prompts, or using the model for adjacent steps like audit triage and exploit strategy.
What does Project Glasswingâs vulnerability scale suggest about how attackers might repurpose Mythos style findings?
Large scale bug discovery in broad codebases hints that attackers can automate reconnaissance and prioritization, then concentrate human effort where fixes or exploitation are most profitable.
Why might Egorov expect more operational security compromises than direct DeFi draining?
Smart contracts have limited surface area compared with complex application stacks. If the model finds patterns faster, the easiest payoff may shift toward keys, multisigs, and frontend dependency attacks.
What could âsitting ducksâ mean operationally for DeFi protocols that rely on older audits and unchanged logic?
Once known issues get cheaper to test against, attackers can repeatedly probe, especially on forks and upgrade paths, turning past findings into constant automated checks.
If only select providers get Mythos 5 with loosened safeguards, how might that reshape the attacker advantage gap?
It could narrow the gap for defenders and researchers who get faster capability, but attackers can still benefit from the public model, using it to generate hypotheses and verify targets with existing tooling.
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